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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION AS AN AUDITOR PERSUASION TACTIC 
 
BY 
 
KERRI-ANN GOODEN-SANDERSON 
 
AUGUST 2014 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jennifer Joe 
 
Major Academic Unit: School of Accounting 
 
This study examines how reliance on the client’s internal audit function (IAF) affects 
auditors’ ability to persuade management to accept  material weakness assessments of 
detected internal control deficiencies.  I further investigate whether auditors’ ability to 
persuade management to accept material weakness assessments depends on the 
subjectivity the control deficiency assessment to varied interpretations (ambiguity).  I 
apply group affiliation and persuasion theories to hypothesize that management will have 
higher group identification with the IAF than with the auditors.  I predict that 
management’s group affiliation will lead them to be more accepting of auditors’ internal 
control assessments when the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when auditors do not.  
Further, I hypothesize that the greater the ambiguity in the internal control deficiency 
assessment, the more persuaded management will be to accept the auditors’ control 
assessment in situations where the auditors rely on the IAF than when the auditors do not.  
I conduct an experiment using a 2 X 2 between-subjects design in which I manipulate 
auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF during tests of the client’s internal controls (rely or 
not rely) and the level of ambiguity in the internal control deficiency assessment (less 
ambiguous or more ambiguous) in a SOX 404 Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting 
(ICFR) audit setting.  The study’s findings provide evidence that relying on the client’s 
IAF can improve auditors’ likelihood of persuading the client when control assessments 
are more open to varied interpretations.  This study sheds light on a previously ignored 
benefit of using the client’s IAF – as a persuasion tactic.  Thus, my research contributes 
to two literature streams: factors influencing auditor-client negotiations and the effects of 
using the IAF on audit engagements. These results provide both practical and theoretical 
insights to academics, practitioners and auditing standard setters. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Auditors and clients regularly engage in negotiations during the financial statement 
reporting process (Gibbins et al. 2001) and the results of these negotiations are reflected in the 
final product - audited financial statements (e.g., Brown and Wright 2008).  Consequently, the 
content of audited financial statements can be considered to be a result of the joint efforts of 
company management and their auditors (Antle and Nalebuff 1991).
1
     
While auditors and management engage in discussions and negotiations to resolve 
proposed financial statement adjustments (e.g., Gibbins et al. 2001, Hatfield et al. 2010), it is 
likely that they also engage in such negotiations to resolve differences in classifications of 
detected internal control deficiencies that affect the Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting 
(ICFR) audit opinion.  The severity of the control deficiency
2
 is determined by the potential for a 
misstatement to be material and the likelihood that the misstatement would not be 
detected/prevented.  The most severe deficiency, material weakness, is a deficiency in internal 
controls where there is a “reasonable possibility” that a “material” misstatement in the 
company’s financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis (PCAOB 
2007).  Material weaknesses that are not remediated by year-end result in the auditors issuing an 
adverse opinion on the effectiveness of that company’s internal controls over financial reporting.  
These criteria defining the classification of internal control deficiencies can be complex and 
ambiguous (Bedard and Graham 2011; Asare and Wright 2012) and likely lead to contentious 
discussions and negotiations between auditors and management especially when an adverse 
                                                 
1
 In addition to an opinion on the presentation of the client’s financial statements, auditors also render an opinion on 
the effectiveness of the client’s internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR; PCAOB 2007). 
2
 According to Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB 2007), auditors assess a company’s internal controls over financial 
reporting as either operating effectively or as being deficient.  There are three categorizations for deficient controls, 
listed from least to most severe: (1) control deficiency, (2) significant deficiency, or (3) material weakness.  Unlike 
the other classifications, material weaknesses are disclosed to the public in the form of an adverse ICFR audit 
opinion. 
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ICFR opinion is at issue.
3
  Research finds that auditors’ ICFR assessments are important because 
adverse opinions can have negative ramifications for companies and management in the form of 
lower share prices (Hammersley et al. 2008), increased costs of capital (Ashbough-Skaife et al. 
2009), and higher management turnover (Johnstone et al. 2011).      
This study investigates how reliance on the client’s internal audit function (IAF) affects 
auditors’4 ability to persuade management to accept material weakness assessments of detected 
internal control deficiencies.  I examine whether the persuasive effects of IAF use is conditional 
upon the degree of ambiguity associated with the classification of internal control deficiencies 
under Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5; PCAOB 2007).  Prior studies that investigate auditor-client 
negotiations primarily focus on financial statement adjustment settings (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008, 
Sanchez et al. 2007; Ng and Tan 2003).  In a financial statement context, the emphasis of 
negotiations is on reconciling differences in auditor evaluations of past economic transactions 
(and related valuations) with those of management to ensure that financial statements are not 
materially misstated in actuality.  On the other hand, in an ICFR audit, auditors evaluate the 
client’s internal controls over financial reporting to opine on whether controls are operating 
effectively (i.e., whether the internal controls could reasonably be expected to prevent or detect a 
material misstatement in the financial statements).
5
  In this way, the ICFR context provides a 
different and important setting in which to investigate auditor-client negotiations.  An ICFR audit 
setting involves a predictive (or forward-looking) judgment about the potential occurrence of 
undetected misstatements as opposed to a judgment about an actual misstatement occurrence 
                                                 
3
 Anecdotal evidence gathered through conversations with practicing auditors and senior accounting executives 
confirm that discussions and negotiations between auditors and management can become heated and contentious 
especially when related to issues about internal control deficiencies that are classified as material weaknesses by the 
auditors.  
4
 To avoid confusion between internal and external auditors I use the term “auditor(s)” throughout this paper to refer 
to the client’s external auditors. Internal auditors are referred to as the IAF.   
5
 Auditing standards indicate that a material weakness in internal controls can exist even when financial statements 
are not materially misstated (Auditing Standard No. 5; PCAOB 2007). 
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based on past events as is the case in the financial statement audit setting.  In addition, the 
assessment of the client’s internal controls affects the nature and extent of subsequent 
substantive testing planned for the financial statement audit.  In this light, and also considering 
that there is limited prior research investigating auditor-client negotiations in the ICFR audit 
setting, my study is important and contributes to the initial academic dialogue on ICFR 
negotiations.     
Research finds that relying on the client’s IAF can benefit the audit process by reducing 
the amount of testing directly performed by the auditors resulting in cost savings and increased 
audit efficiency measured by reduced audit delays (e.g., Felix et al. 2001; Pizzini et al. 2012; 
Abbott et al. 2012b).  Prior studies on auditor-client negotiations have examined the effects of 
auditor persuasion strategies such as the general negotiation approach (e.g., Honglin et al. 2011; 
Gibbins et al. 2010), reciprocity (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008; Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007; Sanchez 
et al. 2007), and auditor concessions (Ng and Tan 2003) on auditor-client negotiations.  This 
study contributes to the internal audit reliance and client negotiation literatures by examining a 
previously unexplored benefit of relying on the client’s IAF – as a useful persuasion tactic to 
convince management to acknowledge adverse internal control deficiencies which require public 
disclosure in the auditors’ report.      
Group affiliation and persuasion theories suggest that individuals have higher 
identification with groups with which they are affiliated (an in-group) and are more persuaded by 
messages received from in-group sources than by messages received from out-group sources 
(e.g., Mackie et al. 1992).  Additionally, when the message involves the evaluation of more 
ambiguous cues, the persuasion effects of the in-group source is further enhanced because the 
individual relies more on heuristic cues (e.g., the message source) to interpret the message 
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(Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994; Hafer et al. 1996).  Applying these theories, I hypothesize that 
management will have higher identification with the IAF than with auditors, and will be more 
persuaded to accept auditors’ control assessments when auditors rely on the IAF than when 
auditors do not.  Additionally, I hypothesize that the ambiguity of the control deficiency 
assessment moderates auditors’ ability to persuade management.  That is, when the judgment 
involved in assessing the internal control deficiency is more open to different interpretations, 
auditors will more likely persuade management when they rely versus do not rely on the IAF.         
Using a SOX 404 ICFR audit setting, I  conduct an experiment in which I manipulate: (1) 
auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF during tests of the client’s internal controls (rely or not 
rely), and (2) the degree of ambiguity in the internal control deficiency assessment (less 
ambiguous or more ambiguous).  I use an ICFR setting because prior research finds that the 
consequences of receiving an adverse internal control assessment have severe implications for 
the company and its management (e.g., Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbough-Skaife et al. 2009; 
Johnstone et al. 2011).  I use management’s willingness to accept the auditors’ adverse internal 
control assessment as a measure of auditors’ ability to persuade management.   To capture 
management’s identification with the internal and external auditors, I use an adapted 
organization identification scale (Bamber and Iyer 2007) to measure participants’ group 
identification with both the IAF and the auditors (within-subjects). Using a sample of accounting 
professionals with experience performing internal controls assessments, I find that management 
has higher identification with their IAF than they do with auditors and that management 
perceives control testing results to be more credible when auditors rely versus do not rely on the 
IAF.  Consistent with my prediction, I also find that when the control assessment is more open to 
interpretation, management is more persuaded to accept an adverse control assessment when 
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auditors rely on the client’s IAF.  However, evidence suggests that these persuasive effects 
disappear when the control assessment is less open to interpretation.  In fact, in such settings, 
relying on the client’s IAF may be to the auditors’ disadvantage when trying to persuade 
management to accept an adverse ICFR opinion.   
Understanding factors that improve auditors’ likelihood of persuading the client has 
theoretical and practical implications for academics, practitioners, and accounting standard 
setters.  This study extends the literature and informs the audit practice by examining how using 
the client’s IAF on the ICFR audit can influence management to disclose material weaknesses.  
Using an archival approach, Lin et al. (2011) find that companies are more likely to disclose 
material weakness control deficiencies when auditors coordinate audit activities with the client’s 
IAF.
6
  In their “IAF coordination” variable, Lin et al. (2011) include activities such as loaning 
IAF staff to the auditors, the IAF performing complete or partial audits of locations/functions, 
conducting joint annual planning sessions with the IAF, as well as conducting joint risk/control 
sessions with the IAF.  By examining the effects of these IAF coordination activities as a single 
composite variable, Lin et al.’s (2011) study does not specifically disentangle which of these 
activities influence companies to increase disclosures of material weaknesses nor does the study 
examine how these activities effect greater disclosure.  My study extends Lin et al. (2011) by 
investigating how using the client’s IAF in the capacity of direct assistants on the audit can 
increase the persuasiveness of audit findings that influence management to disclose material 
weaknesses.  I also examine control deficiency contexts within which such persuasion may be 
effective.  Beyond the findings of Lin et al. (2011), this study provides evidence that the 
persuasive effects of coordinating audit testing activities with the client’s IAF is conditional 
                                                 
6
 Lin et al. (2011) uses a single composite measure of auditor-IAF coordination which includes several different 
activities.  In their study, the indicator variable is coded as “1” if the auditor engages in any of these activities with 
the client’s IAF, “0” otherwise. 
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upon the nature of the control deficiency at issue.   That is, when the assessment of the control 
deficiency is more open to interpretation, management is more persuaded by the auditors’ 
message when auditors rely on the IAF for direct assistance.  However, these persuasive effects 
dissipate when the assessment of the control deficiency is less open to interpretation.   
Auditing standards (e.g., Auditing Standard No. 5, Public Company Auditing Oversight 
Board [PCAOB] 2007) provide guidance regarding auditors’ use of the client’s IAF during 
financial statement audits especially on ICFR audits.  This study can provide further insights to 
standard setters as they prescribe how and in what contexts auditors can utilize the client’s IAF 
during the financial statement assurance process. 
In the next sections of the paper, I discuss the relevant literature and develop my 
hypotheses, followed by a discussion of the investigation method.  I then discuss my findings 
and implications.  
II. BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
2.1 Auditor Negotiation with the Client 
Although company management is responsible for the content and presentation of the 
financial statements, the end product can be thought of as resulting from the joint efforts of 
auditors and management (Antle and Nalebuff 1991).  In a survey study, Gibbins et al. (2001) 
report that  67 percent of audit partners have entered into negotiations regarding adjustments to 
the financial statements with more than half of their clients.  This evidence indicates that auditor-
client negotiations are common and play an important role in the audit process as well as in the 
broader auditor-client relationship.      
Earlier studies on auditor-client negotiations provide practical and descriptive evidence to 
promote our understanding of the experiences and incentives of the negotiating parties (e.g., 
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Gibbins et al. 2001; Gibbins et al. 2005, 2007).  Subsequent studies further examine the auditor-
client negotiation process and find that the process is influenced by several factors including 
engagement risk and auditor experience (Johnstone et al. 2002; Brown and Johnstone 2009 ); the 
effects of past client relationship as well as audit committee strength and effectiveness or 
existence of authoritative guidance (Ng and Tan 2003; Brown and Wright 2011); and the 
magnitude of audit differences and prior client concessions (Hatfield et al. 2010).  This study 
aims to extend the literature by investigating how coordinating audit activities with the client’s 
IAF can also be a factor that influences the auditor-client negotiation process.   
Prior studies that investigate auditor-client negotiations primarily focus on financial 
statement adjustment settings (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008, Sanchez et al. 2007; Ng and Tan 2003). 
 
This paper aims to extend the current literature to provide evidence of how the client’s IAF could 
be used as an auditor persuasion tactic in an ICFR audit setting.
7
  In an ICFR context, auditors 
evaluate the client’s internal controls over financial reporting and opine on whether these 
controls are operating effectively so as to prevent (or detect) a material misstatement in the 
financial statements.
8
  As such, the ICFR context involves a predictive judgment about the 
potential occurrence of a misstatement rather than an actual misstatement judgment based on 
past events as is the case in the financial statement audit setting.  In this way, the predictive 
judgment involved in ICFR evaluations may be based on comparatively less objective evidence 
of a misstatement than judgments regarding an actual financial statement misstatement.  Bedard 
and Graham (2011) find that in the absence of objective evidence of a misstatement, the 
evaluation of the severity of control deficiencies is a more complex and nuanced judgment 
                                                 
7
 There is a paucity of research of auditor-client negotiations in an ICFR context. Most studies focus on the financial 
statement adjustment setting (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008, Sanchez et al. 2007; Ng and Tan 2003). 
8
 Auditing standards indicate that a material weakness in internal controls may exist even when financial statements 
are not materially misstated (Auditing Standard No. 5 2007). 
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process.  Given that internal control deficiency judgments are based on less objective evidence 
and considering that adverse ICFR opinions can have negative implications for companies and 
management,
9
 auditors likely face a contentious ICFR negotiation process with management 
especially when presented with an adverse internal control deficiency opinion.  Therefore, 
examining auditor negotiation strategies in an ICFR audit context is important to the practice and 
the accounting literature because of the relative complexities involved in evaluating internal 
control deficiencies and convincing management to disclose severe deficiencies (Bedard and 
Graham 2011).     
 Prior studies that have investigated the effects of governance factors on the auditor-client 
negotiation process have mainly focused on the audit committee (e.g., Ng and Tan 2003; Brown 
and Wright 2011).  These findings suggest that audit committee strength affects auditors’ 
perceived bargaining power and that this governance factor influences their pre-negotiation 
planning judgments and negotiation strategies.   This study aims to extend the prior corporate 
governance literature by examining the effects of another corporate governance factor on the 
auditor-client negotiation process – the client’s IAF. 
2.2 Auditor Reliance on Internal Auditors 
Responding to critics following the issuance of Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2; PCAOB 
2004), the PCAOB announced that the inspection process would have an increased focus on 
efficiency rather than mainly effectiveness (PCAOB 2006).  Under their revised approach, the 
inspection process would evaluate whether auditors relied on the client’s internal audit function 
(IAF) to the level permitted in AS2 (PCAOB 2006).  AS2 was subsequently amended to 
Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5; PCAOB 2007) which calls for auditors to employ a top-down 
                                                 
9
 The consequences of receiving an adverse internal control assessment could have severe implications for the 
company and its management. For example, disclosures of “material weaknesses” have been associated with lower 
share prices (Hammersley et al. 2008) and increased costs of capital (Ashbough-Skaife et al. 2009). 
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risk-based approach that includes increased utilization of the IAF depending on the risk 
associated with the control being tested.  AS5 prescribes that the auditor may utilize the client’s 
IAF when performing tests related to the financial statement and ICFR audits.  The PCAOB 
emphasized that using a client’s IAF on these audits may increase audit efficiency (PCAOB 
2007).  In support of the PCAOB’s position, Abbott et al. (2012b) find that utilizing the client’s 
IAF results in cost savings as well as increased audit efficiency.     
Before relying on the client’s IAF, the auditors must first assess the relevancy of the 
client’s IAF activities to the financial statement and/or ICFR audit process and whether 
efficiencies can be gained by utilizing the IAF.  If the IAF activities are deemed relevant and 
beneficial to the audit process, the auditors must then evaluate the quality of the IAF before 
engagement.  Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 65 (AICPA 1991) requires the auditor 
to assess the quality of the client’s IAF using three criteria: competence, objectivity, and quality 
of the work performed.
10
  In cases where the IAF is found to be of sufficient quality, the auditor 
should then evaluate the nature and extent of any reliance that will be placed on the IAF’s work 
(e.g., Pizzini et al. 2012).  Auditors may rely on IAF testing related to internal controls 
evaluation, as well as those related to substantive testing depending on the nature of the risk 
involved (PCAOB 2007).   
Prior literature focuses largely on how the factors outlined in SAS No. 65, as well as 
other client characteristics impact auditors’ decisions to rely on the IAF’s work (e.g., Maletta 
1993; Maletta and Kida 1993; Felix et al. 2005; Munro and Stewart 2010; Pizzini et al. 2012; 
Abbott et al. 2012a).
11
  Primarily, these studies examine how IAF quality characteristics and 
                                                 
10
 The three primary IAF quality characteristics are competence (e.g., educational level, certification), objectivity 
(e.g., reporting relationship, party responsible for IAF employment decisions), and quality of work performance 
(e.g., adequacy of audit programs, scope of work performed) (AICPA 1991). 
11
 See Bame-Aldred et al. (2013) for a review of external auditor reliance on the IAF. 
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other governance factors affect auditors’ reliance decision in the financial statement audit 
environment.  This study extends the literature by examining the effects of reliance on the IAF in 
an ICFR context and the resulting effects on the auditor-client negotiation process.    
In an archival setting, Lin et al. (2011) find that companies have greater disclosure of 
material weaknesses when auditors coordinate audit activities with the IAF.  In their study, Lin et 
al. (2011) aggregate several different methods through which auditors coordinate audit activities 
with the IAF into a single variable.   The  “coordination” variable, includes any of the following 
activities: “loaning IAF staff to the external auditors; performing complete or partial audits of 
specific locations, products, or functions; conducting joint annual planning sessions; and 
conducting joint risk or control sessions” (p. 301).   Since “coordination” with the IAF is 
considered to occur if any one or all of these activities occur, the study does not disentangle how 
or which of these variables affect material weakness disclosures (e.g., whether coordination with 
the client’s IAF allows auditors to identify more control deficiencies, better evaluate identified 
deficiencies, or better persuade management to disclose deficiencies, etc.).  Beyond the benefits 
of coordinating audit activities with the IAF, I investigate whether auditors’ direct engagement 
of the client’s IAF increases the credibility of internal control testing results and increases 
management’s willingness to accept an adverse internal control opinion.  By auditors providing a 
more persuasive message, management may be more likely to make material weakness 
disclosures when auditors engage the IAF as direct assistants in audit testing. 
III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Persuasion: In-Group versus Out-Group 
 Membership in social groups is an important aspect of the individual members’ self-
concept (Brewer 1991; Triandis 1989) that significantly affects the likelihood that the individual 
11 
 
will be persuaded by information cues (e.g., Mackie et al. 1992; Mackie et al. 1990).  Mackie et 
al. (1992) and Mackie et al. (1990) find that people are more persuaded by messages received 
from in-group sources than out-group sources.  These studies suggest that the significant 
persuasion effect of in-group sources is due to group members using the information source as a 
heuristic cue, as well as a systematic cue (to a lesser extent), to (1) accept the message and (2) 
process the in-group members’ position.12   Accounting research finds that when in-group 
identification is higher, auditors tend to be more lenient in resolving accounting issues with their 
client (Bamber and Iyer 2007).  Auditors are also less skeptical when reviewing work performed 
by their own firm (Joe and Vandervelde 2007), and are more likely to do business with their 
former audit firm than with other firms (Iyer et al. 1997). 
Research suggests that management is likely to identify more with the IAF than they 
would with the auditors i.e., on a hypothetical continuum, management would likely consider the 
IAF to be more representative of in-group members than they would their auditors.  This is the 
case because the IAF is more integrated into an organization’s regular operations and activities.  
For example, when performing operational and compliance audits, the IAF has opportunities to 
develop relationships with management (Bou-Raad 2000) and the audit committee (Carcello et 
al. 2005).  Findings from Knippenberg and Schie (2000) suggest that these and other types of 
interactions between internal auditors and management enhance group identification.  Further, 
Stefaniak et al. (2012) find that internal auditors have a greater level of identification with their 
firm than auditors do (with the same firm).  As a result, I expect that the reciprocal will occur.  
                                                 
12
 Self-categorization theory, which suggests that the one’s concept of self fluctuates between personal and social 
identities, is thought to provide an explanation for these underlying in-group persuasion effects (Turner et al. 1987).  
When individuals’ social identity is more prominent in a given situation, they tend to focus more on their 
membership with the social in-group and the similarities / characteristics they share with this group.  In this way, 
information pertaining to the in-group becomes part of the person’s self-concept (Smith and Henry 1996). 
12 
 
Specifically, I anticipate that a company’s management will have greater in-group affiliation 
with the IAF than they will with the auditors. This leads to my first hypothesis:  
H1: Management will have higher group identification with the IAF than they will 
with the auditors. 
 
 Perceived similarities with in-group members are thought to influence persuasion in one 
of two ways.  First, individuals might more readily accept an in-group member’s argument by 
using the in-group’s status as a heuristic cue so that they are more likely to agree with “similar 
others” (Allen and Wilder 1979).  Second, messages from in-group sources might also be 
perceived as coming from a more credible source thereby, making the message a more credible 
one (Chaiken 1980).  Therefore, in the context of auditor-client negotiations over ICFR 
classifications I expect that management will likely find control testing results to be more 
credible when their IAF participates in executing control testing and will be more persuaded to 
accept resultant internal control assessments.      
Further, considering that IAFs are more directly compensated by the client company and 
could have greater incentive to bias their evaluations toward their employer (Dezoort et al. 
2000), management may be more inclined to agree with an adverse control deficiency that 
internal auditors find due to the perception that the IAF is more of an ally than the auditors.
13
  
That is, managements’ underlying expectation that their IAF may be more biased against 
assessing control weaknesses as severe, may lead management to give more consideration to 
severe deficiencies identified by their IAF.  Accordingly, I expect that when auditors rely on the 
client’s IAF during internal controls testing, management’s in-group affiliation with the IAF will 
make the auditors’ control assessments more persuasive.   Therefore, management will be more 
                                                 
13
 Notwithstanding, Stefaniak et al. (2012) find evidence that internal auditors are less lenient than external auditors 
when evaluating their client firm’s control deficiencies. If management is aware of this effect, they may be less 
likely to agree with internal auditor-aided assessments.  
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persuaded to accept the auditors’ internal control assessment when the auditors rely on the 
company’s IAF than when the auditors do not.14  This leads to my next hypothesis:  
H2: Management will be more persuaded by the auditors’ control assessments when  
  the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when they do not.  
 
3.2 Control Deficiency Evaluations 
 Evaluating control deficiencies using the definitions described in accounting standards is 
a complex task involving significant judgment (Earley et al. 2008; Bedard and Graham 2011).  
Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) defines a material weakness as a deficiency, or a combination of 
deficiencies, where there is a reasonable possibility that a material financial statement 
misstatement will not be timely prevented or detected
15
 (PCAOB 2007).  From the AS5 control 
deficiency definition, it is evident that material weakness evaluations contain two elements of 
judgment: the magnitude of the misstatement (i.e., the misstatement must be evaluated as 
material) as well as the likelihood that such a misstatement will not be prevented / detected in a 
timely manner (i.e., the likelihood must be assessed at least as a “reasonable possibility”).  I 
propose that financial statement preparers and auditors have more experience evaluating 
materiality than they do the likelihood of detection.  Therefore, evaluating the integration of 
magnitude and likelihood of a control weakness leading to a misstatement becomes a variably 
complex judgment that can be interpreted differently.   
 Accounting standards place heavy emphasis on assessing materiality and have provided 
significant guidance to financial statement preparers and auditors (e.g., AS No. 11, AS5).  Prior 
studies find that materiality is typically assessed in relation to the company’s income (e.g., 
                                                 
14
 In the event that an alternate argument presented in the popular press is true, if managers hold the view that IAFs 
are ineffective (e.g., Coenen 2008; Cooper 2008), they will discount IAF findings and recommendations which will 
limit the persuasiveness of message-sources that include the IAF.  In this way, auditor reliance on the client’s IAF 
might not provide any incremental persuasion. 
15
 In contrast, AS5 describes a significant deficiency as a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, that is less 
severe than a material weakness but is nonetheless important to warrant management’s attention. 
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Robinson and Fertuck 1985; Icerman and Hillison 1991; Wright and Wright 1997), is consistent 
across audit firms (Messier et al. 2005), and that auditors’ and investors’ materiality judgments 
are similar (Chewning et al. 1998).  Thus, the task of evaluating materiality is considered to be a 
regularly performed task and one in which financial statement preparers and auditors utilize a 
general decision framework.  
 On the other hand, there is limited authoritative guidance and there is no commonly used 
decision framework for assessing the likelihood that a control will detect or prevent a 
misstatement in a timely manner.  Accounting standards define the likelihood of an event 
occurring using phrases such as “remote,” “reasonable possibility,” and “probable” (e.g., AS 
No.5) without providing a comprehensive framework for how these phrases are to be interpreted 
and applied in a practical context.  Consequently, studies find that the criteria used for judging 
misstatement likelihood is ambiguous in practice due to the difficulties in interpreting the related 
probability phrases (e.g., Reimers 1992; Reimers et al. 1993; Amer et al. 1994; Brody et al. 
2003; Doupnik and Rechter 2004; Asare and Wright 2012; Bedard and Graham 2011).  These 
studies suggest that interpreting probability phrases such as those defining a material weakness is 
relatively more ambiguous and open to varied interpretations than assessing materiality due to 
the lack of comprehensive authoritative guidance and a general framework.   Therefore, 
assessing the likelihood of detecting a misstatement is a comparatively more complex task 
involving greater judgment and the evaluation of more ambiguous cues than that of assessing the 
magnitude of a misstatement.      
3.3 The Effects of Perceived Message Ambiguity and Group Affiliation on Persuasion 
 The ambiguity of the message cues likely impacts the ability of the message source to 
effect persuasion.   Psychological research finds that when message cues are more ambiguous, 
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and are more open to varied interpretation, individuals rely on heuristic processing and are more 
persuaded when the message is delivered by a more credible messenger (Chaiken and 
Maheswaran 1994).  However, when message cues are less ambiguous, source credibility has 
limited impact on persuasion (Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994).  These findings suggest that for 
messages with more varied interpretations, individuals will rely more on the message source to 
interpret the argument.  Applying the results of Mackie et al. (1992), individuals will perceive in-
group members as having higher credibility than they will out-group messengers and therefore, 
will be more persuaded by more ambiguous message cues delivered by in-group members.  
Thus, sources with which management identifies more (i.e., the IAF) will be more persuasive 
when the subject matter of the message is more subject to differential interpretation (i.e., more 
ambiguous).    
 Given that management likely has a better framework and more resources for assessing 
materiality than for assessing the likelihood of detecting a misstatement, they might find 
judgments related to the likelihood of a misstatement to be more open to interpretation than 
judgments related to materiality.  In the context of a material weakness evaluation, I expect 
where the magnitude of the misstatement is high and the likelihood of detection just marginally 
meets the threshold of “reasonably possible,” management will find the evaluation of the control 
assessment to be more ambiguous and open to varied interpretations due to their focus on the 
likelihood of detection judgment.  On the other hand, where the likelihood of detection is high 
and the magnitude of the misstatement just marginally meets the threshold of “materiality,” 
management will find the evaluation of the control assessment to be less ambiguous due to their 
focus on the misstatement magnitude judgment (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). 
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In keeping with effects of group affiliation in persuasion theories, I expect that the 
ambiguity of the message cue will moderate the effects of group affiliation on message 
persuasiveness in an assurance setting.  That is, when management perceives the judgment to be 
more open to interpretation (i.e., ambiguous), they will be more persuaded by messages from in-
group sources than by messages from out-group sources.  Therefore, when the control deficiency 
evaluation involves more ambiguous message cues (i.e., more open to interpretation), it is likely 
that management will be more persuaded to accept the control assessment when the auditors rely 
on the client’s IAF than when the auditors do not rely on this function for control testing.  This 
leads to my next hypothesis. 
H3: When the assessment of the control deficiency is more open to interpretation 
(ambiguous), management will be more persuaded to accept the auditors’ control 
assessment when the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when the auditors do 
not rely on the IAF.   
  
Further, given the moderating effects of message cue ambiguity on persuasion, I expect 
that the likelihood of persuasion will be greatest when the message is more ambiguous and the 
message is communicated by an in-group source.  That is, management will be more persuaded 
by the auditors’ control assessment when the judgment is more open to interpretation (i.e., 
ambiguous) and the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when the judgment involved with the 
control assessment is less ambiguous.   I expect this moderating effect of message source will 
diminish when the message is less ambiguous (Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994). 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Insert Figure 4 here 
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IV. METHOD 
4.1 Participants 
This study’s research question investigates the likelihood that auditors can persuade 
management to accept a material weakness control assessment.  As such, accounting 
professionals who have responsibility over the ICFR audit, and who more frequently discuss 
accounting related issues with auditors make up the target participant pool for this study.  
Therefore, I obtain a convenience sample of accounting professionals who have experience 
evaluating internal controls over financial reporting and discussing financial statement issues 
with auditors to proxy my target participants and address the research questions.    
I recruited participants from two state CPA societies located in the southeast US via their 
respective membership online discussion groups.
16
  I also retained the services of an academic 
research participant search firm with a participant pool spanning the US.  Participants were 
required to be accounting professionals with experience performing internal controls assessments 
and discussing audit issues with auditors.  Study materials were administered via the Internet 
using Qualtrics and participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions (Wade and 
Tingling 2005).  There was no difference in the allocation of participants from these recruiting 
sources across experimental conditions.
17
   
One hundred and fifteen participants completed my experimental instrument.  
Participants ranged from 21 to 72 years old, with the average age being 43 years old.  
Approximately 70% of the participants were male and approximately 77% were CPAs.  Seventy-
four percent reported they had practiced public accounting (auditing). Of the participants who 
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 These states require members of their state CPA online groups to be registered CPAs with the state’s CPA 
regulatory agency.   
17
  Using a chi-square test, there is no statistical difference in the allocation of participants from these two recruiting 
sources across the four experimental conditions ( χ2 [3] = 0.40, p = 0.94 two-tailed).   
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practiced public accounting, the average time spent in this practice was nine years.  Fifty percent 
of the participants reported that they had internal auditing experience.  Participants with internal 
auditing experience reported an average of five years experience in the practice.  Participants 
reported having average experience of nine years assessing internal controls and nine years 
discussing financial statement issues with auditors (see Table 1).  
4.2 Experimental Design 
To test my hypotheses, I conduct an experiment using a 2 X 2 between-subjects design in 
which I manipulate the auditors’ reliance on the IAF for internal control testing (rely or not rely), 
and the ambiguity of the control deficiency assessment (less ambiguous or more ambiguous).  
Using an ICFR control assessment setting, I measure managers’ willingness to accept the 
auditors’ control assessment as my dependent variable.   
To develop the experimental instrument used in this study, I conducted pilot testing with 
21 accounting professionals whose mean age was 43 and who had who spent an average of five 
years in their current accounting role.  Several participants were practicing controllers, CFOs, 
and SOX compliance officers in their company.  Pilot participants had an average of four years 
experience performing internal controls assessments and discussing related issues with their 
auditors.  Feedback garnered from the pilot was used to refine the experimental instrument so as 
to increase the salience of the manipulated variables, enhance the realism of the control 
deficiency scenario, and improve the clarity of the dependent variable related questions.     
4.3 Procedures 
 Participants read a hypothetical case about an ICFR audit engagement.  I adapted the case 
used in Stefaniak et al. (2012) and a material weakness scenario used in Appendix D of AS2 
19 
 
(PCAOB 2004).
18
  In this study, participants assumed the role of the CFO for Tango Sierra 
(Tango), a publicly-traded manufacturer of electronic equipment based in the United States.  The 
CFO has responsibility for preparing the company’s financial statements and disclosing material 
weaknesses in internal controls. Tango has had consistent sales and income growth over the past 
several years, has retained the same external auditors for the past five years, and has received 
clean financial statement and ICFR opinions in prior audits.  Participants were told that Tango 
has an IAF that is regarded as being of a high quality.  Many of the internal auditors hold 
professional certifications (e.g., CPA, CIA) and are objective and competent in the auditing work 
they do.  Auditors and the IAF have direct access to the Tango’s Audit Committee.  Participants 
were also told that tests of internal controls for Sarbanes Oxley compliance reporting purposes 
are not performed by Tango’s IAF, rather such tests are performed by a separate Controls 
Testing department.  Before describing the deficient control, the case provides participants with 
the definition of a material weakness including references to materiality and likelihood as two 
criteria specifically addressed in the definition provided in AS5.     
The experimental instrument describes a scenario in which, at year-end, Tango’s auditors 
perform control testing for the ICFR audit.  Tango has a standard sales contract, but sales 
personnel often modify the standard contract terms to grant unauthorized and unrecorded sales 
discounts to customers without the knowledge of AR personnel.  Since AR personnel are 
unaware of the sales discounts, the entire sales amount is recorded as an outstanding balance on 
the AR aging and results in sales and AR overstatements.   
The case indicates that auditors perform ICFR testing by either using Tango’s IAF as 
direct assistants (rely condition) or by using the auditors’ own staff (not rely condition) to carry 
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 The Securities and Exchange Commission published examples of material weakness control deficiency scenarios 
with the publication of PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2 (2004).  
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out testing procedures.  Based on the results of control testing, the auditors determine the 
magnitude of the potential misstatement as well as the likelihood that the misstatement would not 
be detected or prevented by the current controls.  The description of these two factors form the 
bases for the manipulation of judgment ambiguity in this experiment.  That is, in the Less 
Ambiguous condition, the case presents a scenario where the magnitude of the potential 
misstatement is marginal at 4.5% of pretax income (i.e., greater than “significant” but on the 
lower threshold of being material) and the likelihood that the misstatement is not 
detected/prevented is greater than “remote” at 70% (i.e., clearly “reasonably possible;” see 
Figure 2).  Whereas, in the More Ambiguous condition, the case presents a scenario where the 
magnitude of the potential misstatement is greater than “significant” at 6% of pretax income (i.e., 
clearly material) and the likelihood that the misstatement is not detected/prevented is marginal at 
25% (i.e., greater than “remote” but on the lower threshold of being “reasonably possible;” see 
Figure 2).
19
  To maintain the integrity of the experimental design, the control weakness meets the 
definition of a material weakness in both ambiguity conditions.   
Participants were then shown an excerpt of the auditors working papers with information 
that reinforced the details presented in the case (see Appendix).  Given that the control 
deficiency was discovered at year-end (Tango does not have time to perform remediation) and 
there are no compensating controls, the auditors assess the control deficiency as a material 
weakness.  After reading the case materials, participants answered questions regarding their 
willingness to accept the auditors control assessment of material weakness.  They also answered 
questions relating to their identification with the IAF and the auditors as well as manipulation 
check and demographic related questions.    
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 More details regarding the Ambiguity conditions is provided under the Independent Variables section of the 
paper.  
21 
 
4.4 Independent Variables 
To manipulate the ambiguity of the control deficiency assessment, I use different 
combinations of the two factors that interplay to define the severity of a control deficiency – (1) 
the materiality of a potential misstatement, and (2) the likelihood that a misstatement is not 
prevented / detected in the financial statements (AS5, PCAOB 2007; see Figure 1).  For a control 
deficiency to be defined as a “material weakness,” it must meet the following criteria: (1) the 
potential misstatement must be material, and (2) the likelihood that the misstatement is not 
prevented / detected must be at least “reasonably possible” (AS5, PCAOB 2007).   
Prior studies find that auditors, management and financial statement users use the rule-of-
thumb of four to five percent of pretax income to assess materiality (see Messier et al. 2005 for a 
review).  That is, misstatements with a magnitude lower than four percent of pretax income are 
generally considered to be immaterial; while misstatements greater than five percent of pretax 
income are generally considered to be material.  I use this rule-of-thumb as the parameter to 
design the less / more ambiguous control assessment conditions.    
Regarding the likelihood of not detecting or preventing a misstatement, prior research 
finds that the mean numerical probability threshold that corresponds to the transition from the 
probability phrase “remote” to “reasonably possible” is 16% (i.e., 16% is the mean numerical 
probability for the threshold between “remote” and “reasonably possible;” Harrison and 
Tomassini 1989).
20
  I use this specification as a guide in designing the less / more ambiguous 
control assessment conditions.     
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 Harrison and Tomassini (1989) used a sample of auditors to conduct their study.  They also find an upper quartile  
average of 25% and a lower quartile average of 10% for this remote / reasonably possible threshold. Reimers (1992) 
finds there is agreement among auditors and MBA students on the numerical probability interpretation of probability 
phrases e.g., remote, reasonably possible.   
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As indicated in the prior literature, auditors and management alike have experience with 
(and there are resources in accounting standards) interpreting the materiality and have developed 
simple rules to aid in these determinations (Messier et al. 2005).  As such, there is greater 
consensus surrounding the interpretation of material misstatements.  Whereas, practitioners have 
limited frames of reference for processing the probability phrases used in control deficiency 
definitions (Bedard and Graham 2011; Asare and Wright 2012).  Therefore, in general, assessing 
misstatement materiality is less open to varied interpretations (less ambiguous) than interpreting 
the likelihood scenarios associated with not detecting a misstatement (see Figure 2).  Against this 
theoretical framework, I select a high numerical probability (70%) to reflect the likelihood that a 
misstatement would not be prevented or detected and a marginal measure for the magnitude of 
the potential misstatement (4.5% of pretax income) for the less ambiguous control deficiency 
assessment condition.  By using this configuration, the judgment of whether this deficiency 
meets the definition of a material weakness is more focused on the “materiality” factor (i.e., 
whether the magnitude of this misstatement is material) since the assessment of whether the 
“likelihood” factor meets the criteria for material weakness is more salient (see point “B” in 
Figure 1).  By increasing the salience of the “likelihood” factor as meeting the meeting the 
material weakness criteria, participants’ attention is channeled towards assessing the 
“materiality” factor which is on the margin in this condition.  Determining whether the 
marginally material misstatement meets the criteria of a material weakness is a relatively less 
ambiguous determination for participants to make.                
For the more ambiguous control deficiency assessment condition, I select a marginal 
numerical probability (25%) to reflect the likelihood that a misstatement would not be prevented 
or detected and a high measure for the magnitude of the potential misstatement (6% of pretax 
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income).  By using this configuration, the judgment of whether this deficiency meets the 
definition of a material weakness is more focused on the “likelihood” factor (i.e., whether the 
likelihood is at least “reasonably possible”) since the assessment of whether the “materiality” 
factor meets the criteria for material weakness is more salient (see point “A” in Figure 1). In this 
condition, the materiality of the misstatement is greater than the conventional rule-of-thumb 
whereas, the “likelihood” of not detecting the misstatement is on the margin of “reasonably 
possible.”  By increasing the salience of the “materiality” factor  meeting the criteria, 
participants’ attention is channeled towards the “likelihood” factor.  Making the determination of 
whether the marginal “likelihood” factor meets the criteria for a material weakness is a relatively 
more ambiguous determination for participants to make (Figure 2).    
I consulted with three ex-Big Four financial statement auditors who confirmed that the 
rule-of-thumb of four to five percent of pretax income is currently and widely used in practice by 
auditors and management as a general guideline for materiality.
21
  These prior Big Four auditors 
have extensive experience with assessing internal controls and confirmed that the likelihood 
probabilities selected (i.e., 25% and 70%) were reasonable estimates for the intended 
manipulation and experimental conditions.   
To manipulate auditor reliance on the client’s IAF, in the hypothetical case, I indicate 
whether or not the auditors received control testing assistance from the client’s IAF.  That is, 
control testing was performed by the IAF as direct assistants to the auditors (rely) or performed 
by the auditors’ staff only (not rely). 
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 Each of the ex-auditors have over seven years of public accounting and internal controls experience in multi-
national and publicly traded companies.  Two of the three ex-auditors consulted have significant public accounting 
experience and currently hold leadership accounting roles at publicly traded companies (including Fortune 500 
companies).    
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4.5 Dependent Variable and Group Identification 
After participants read the hypothetical experimental case and the auditors’ control 
assessment, they rated their willingness to accept the auditors’ control assessment of “material 
weakness.” This rating serves as the primary dependent variable and is measured on a seven-
point scale with the first option being “Very Unwilling” and the seventh option being “Very 
Willing.”22 Consistent with prior studies on auditor negotiations (e.g., Hatfield et al. 2008), I use 
this measure of “willingness” to proxy participants’ control assessment persuasion, where a 
higher willingness rating suggests that participants will be more persuaded to accept the auditors’ 
control assessment; and a lower “willingness” rating suggests that participants will be less 
persuaded to accept the auditors’ control assessment.   
 Participants then completed an adapted version of Bamber and Iyer’s (2007) 
Organizational Identification Scale. I modify the identification questions to measure participants’ 
within-subjects identification with Tango’s internal auditors and with Tango’s external auditors 
(see Table 2 for the within-subjects identification questions).  That is, I ask participants of their 
agreement via five statements that measured their group identification with Tango’s IAF (while 
still assuming their role as Tango’s CFO). I use a similar set of statements to measure 
participants’ group identification with Tango’s auditors.23  I use a seven-point scale to measure 
participants’ agreement with the statements (with the first option being “Strongly Disagree” and 
the seventh option being “Strongly Agree”24).  I compare the responses to these two sets of 
statements to determine whether participants’ have a higher group identification with the IAF 
than they do the auditors.  The mean scores from each set of statements comprise management’s 
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 The response options were numerically coded such that “Very Unwilling” = 1 and “Very Willing” = 7.  
23
 I randomize the order in which each set of questions is presented to participants (i.e., IAF first or auditors first). 
24
 The response options were numerically coded such that “Strongly Disagree” = 1 and “Strongly Agree” = 7. 
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group identification with their IAF and auditors.  (See Figure 5 for a summary of hypotheses, 
theoretical constructs, and variable measures). 
V. RESULTS 
5.1 Manipulation Checks 
 To examine whether participants attended to the IAF reliance manipulation, I asked them 
to respond with “yes” or “no” to the question of whether Tango’s IAF assisted Jones Auditors 
(Tango’s external auditors) with AR control testing.  Eighty-one percent of participants correctly 
answered this question in accordance with their reliance condition.   Ninety-one percent of 
participants correctly identified the estimated misstatement magnitude amount referenced in their 
experimental condition.  Ninety percent of participants also correctly indicated the approximate 
likelihood that a misstatement is not detected according to their experimental condition.  
 Given the complex nature of internal control assessments (Earley et al. 2008; Bedard and 
Graham 2011) and my theoretical predictions, I focus data analyses on participants who attended 
to the details of the case and correctly recalled the experimental manipulations (Heppner et al., 
2007).  That is, I analyze the results of the 82 participants who attended to and recalled both the 
auditor reliance and assessment ambiguity manipulations.  There is no statistical difference 
between the demographic profiles of the 115 participants who completed all study materials and 
the 82 participants who correctly recalled the experimental manipulations (see Table 1).  I 
compare participants’ demographic profiles across the four experimental conditions.  With the 
exception of having prior experience practicing public accounting, the demographic profiles of 
the participants are the same across conditions.
25
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 With the exception of Prior Experience in Public Accounting (p = 0.05 two-tailed), mean demographic measures 
(see Table 1) are the same across experimental cells (p values > 0.15 two-tailed).  I control for Prior Experience in 
Public Accounting in all data analyses.     
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 To investigate whether participants perceived the Less (More) Ambiguous experimental 
conditions as being less (more) open to interpretation,  I examine participants’ likelihood to 
challenge the auditors’ control assessment in these conditions.  I expect that participants will be 
more willing to challenge auditors’ control assessment when the control assessment process is 
perceived to be more ambiguous and more open to interpretation.  To this end, I ask participants 
to indicate the likelihood that they will “challenge the external auditor’s control assessment of 
material weakness.”  This rating is measured on a seven-point scale with the first option being 
“Very Unlikely” and the seventh option being “Very Likely.”26 I find that participants in the 
More Ambiguous condition indicated that they were more likely to challenge the auditor’s 
control assessment than participants in the Less Ambiguous condition (5.53 vs. 4.68, 
respectively; p = 0.03 one-tailed; not tabled).  This finding lends support to the theoretical 
development used in this study and also extends accounting research on the ambiguity involved 
in assessing internal control deficiencies.   
 Further analysis finds that participants were manipulated in the Ambiguity conditions by 
the differences in “likelihood” parameters but not by the “materiality” parameters.  Using a 
seven point scale
27, participants’ assessment of the likelihood that a misstatement was not 
prevented / detected is statistically different between  the Ambiguous conditions in keeping with 
the intended manipulation (means = 4.37 [more ambiguous] vs. 5.05 [less ambiguous]; p = 0.03 
two-tailed; not tabled).  However, there is no statistical difference in participants’ assessments 
between the two Ambiguity conditions when asked of their perceptions of the materiality of the 
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 The response options are numerically coded such that “Very Unlikely” = 1 and “Very Likely” = 7.  
27
 The response options are numerically coded such that “Very Unlikely” = 1 and “Very Likely” = 7. 
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potential AR misstatement
28
 (means = 4.08 [more ambiguous] vs. 3.75 [less ambiguous]; p = 
0.23 two-tailed; not tabled).   
5.2 Data Analyses 
I find evidence to support H1 which predicts that management has higher group 
identification with their IAF than they do with the auditors.
29
  Specifically, identification ratings 
for the IAF are higher than those for the auditor (means = 5.28 vs. 3.71, respectively; p < 0.01 
one-tailed; see Table 2).
30
  On a per question pair basis, I also find that identification ratings for 
the IAF are higher than those corresponding to the auditor which lends further support to this 
prediction (all p < 0.01; see Table 2).  These results suggest that management has greater 
identification with their IAF as in-group members than they do with their auditors. I further 
investigate whether management identification with their IAF and auditors differ with auditor 
reliance on the IAF.  Results indicate that auditor IAF reliance does not affect management 
identification with their IAF (means = 5.39 [rely] vs. 5.15 [not rely]; p = 0.18 two-tailed; not 
tabled).   However, I find moderate support that management identifies more with their auditors 
when the auditors rely on the client’s IAF than when the auditors do not (mean = 3.93 [rely] vs. 
3.47 [not rely]; p = 0.07 two-tailed; not tabled).  These results extend Stefaniak et al. (2012) and 
add to the accounting literature by providing evidence that management has greater affiliation 
with their IAF than their auditors.  Further, by relying on the client’s IAF, auditors may be able 
to increase management’s identification with them.  Research finds that management’s increased 
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 Participants’ assessments were made on a seven point scale on a scale with  1= Less Material, and 7 = More 
Material. 
29
 The Cronbach’s alpha of the Organizational Identification scale is 0.81 suggesting the set of items in the scale 
reliably measures a single unidimensional latent construct.     
30
 Statistical inferences are unchanged when using the entire pool of 115 participants (means = 5.28 [IAF] vs. 3.66 
[auditors]; p < 0.01 one-tailed; not tabled).   
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identification with auditors allows auditors to enhance future business relationships with the 
client (e.g., Iyer et al. 1997).      
H2 predicts that management will be more willing to accept the auditors’ control 
assessments when the auditors rely on the company’s IAF than when the auditors do not.  
Contrary to my expectations, I do not find evidence that, in general, management is more willing 
to accept auditors’ control assessments when auditors rely on their IAF for audit testing 
assistance (means = 4.30 [rely] vs. 4.36 [not rely]; p = 0.36 one-tailed; Table 4).
31
   
Based on psychological research on group identification and persuasion (e.g., Mackie et 
al. 1992), I expect that management will find audit testing results to be more credible when 
auditors rely versus do not rely on the IAF.  I find empirical support that management perceives 
internal controls testing results to be more credible when auditors rely on their IAF than when 
auditors do not.  When asked to indicate their agreement with the statement “In your opinion, the 
internal controls testing results were credible,”32 participants’ agreement rating was higher when 
the auditors relied on the IAF for internal controls testing than when the auditors did not (means 
= 5.37 [rely] vs. 4.92 [not rely]; p = 0.03 two-tailed; not tabled).  This finding lends support to 
the theoretical development of H2.
33
  Further, these findings provide evidence for the practical 
implications of relying on the client’s IAF for audit testing.  Relying on the client’s IAF can 
improve the credibility of the auditors’ testing results which may enhance communications 
between auditors and management.  Additional analysis provides evidence that management also 
perceives IAF competence to be higher when auditors rely on the IAF for audit testing (means = 
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 Additional data analysis support this finding. Employing a chi-square test suggests IAF reliance has a moderate 
effect on management’s willingness to accept auditors’ assessments (χ2 [6] = 8.92, p = 0.08 one-tailed).  Kruskal-
Wallis tests indicate no effect of reliance on managements’ willingness (H[1] = 0.001; p = 0.48 one-tailed).  
Similarly, Mann-Whitney tests also indicate that management’s willingness to accept the auditors’ control 
assessment does not differ based on auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF (median = 5.00 [rely] vs. 5.00 [not rely]; U 
= 834.50; z = -0.038; p = 0.48 one-tailed; r = -0.004). 
32
 Using a seven point scale to capture responses where 1 = Strongly Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree. 
33
 Inferences for hypotheses testing remained the same after controlling for this Audit Testing Credibility variable.  
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5.40 [rely] vs. 4.51 [not rely]; p < 0.01 two-tailed; not tabled) and perceives the IAF to be more 
objective when there is auditor IAF reliance (mean = 5.49 [rely] vs. 4.69 [not rely]; p < 0.01 two-
tailed; not tabled).  Notwithstanding, these management perceptions of audit test result 
credibility, IAF competence, and IAF objectivity do not alter the effects of auditor IAF reliance 
on management’s willingness to accept auditors’ assessments.34   
While there is limited support for a main effect of IAF reliance on auditor persuasion, 
evidence suggests that management’s willingness to accept auditors’ control assessments is 
conditional upon two factors - auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF as well as the ambiguity 
involved in evaluating the control deficiency.  I explore this evidence in the evaluation of H3.  In 
H3, I predict that management will be more persuaded to accept the auditors’ control assessment 
when the control assessment is more ambiguous and auditors rely on the IAF than when they do 
not.  Data suggests that auditors’ likelihood of persuading management is conditional upon 
reliance on the client’s IAF and the ambiguity involved in assessing the control deficiency (i.e., 
disordinal interaction between auditors’ reliance on the client’s IAF and control assessment 
ambiguity; p = 0.04 one-tailed; Table 4; Figure 6).
35
  When the evaluation of the control 
deficiency is more ambiguous, management is more willing to accept the auditors’ control 
assessment when auditors rely on the IAF than when they do not (means = 4.47 vs. 3.84, 
respectively; p = 0.10 one-tailed; Table 3).  This finding is consistent with prior psychological 
studies (e.g., Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994) that find that associations with a perceived in-
                                                 
34
 Controlling for management’s perception of audit test result credibility, IAF competence, and IAF objectivity do 
not change the statistical inference that auditor reliance on IAF does not have a main effect on management’s 
willingness to accept auditors’ control assessments ( p = 0.49 one-tailed).  
35
 Results of an ordinal logistic regression support this finding. The coefficient on the interaction of IAF 
Reliance*Ambiguity is 1.25 (positive) and statistically significant (p = 0.05 one-tailed).  To provide additional 
support for this finding, I examine different configurations of participants who participated in the study.  Interaction 
results are statistically significant for participants who pass one or more of the experimental  manipulations. For 
example, participants who pass (1) the IAF Reliance manipulation only (p = 0.04, one-tailed); (2) the IAF Reliance 
and “Materiality” manipulations (p = 0.02, one-tailed); (3) both IAF Reliance and the “Likelihood” manipulations (p 
= 0.05, one-tailed); (4) both Ambiguity manipulations (p = 0.07, one-tailed).  
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group improves the persuasiveness of messages that are more open to interpretation.  However, 
these persuasiveness effects seem to disappear when the evaluation of the control deficiency is 
less open to interpretation.  When the evaluation of the control deficiency is less ambiguous, 
management appears to be more willing to accept the auditors’ control assessment when auditors 
do not rely on the IAF than when they do (means = 4.85 vs. 4.17, respectively; p = 0.10 one-
tailed; Table 3).  These findings suggest that relying on the client’s IAF improves auditors’ 
likelihood of persuading management to accept an adverse control assessment when the 
evaluation of the control is more open to interpretation but not when the evaluation is less open 
to interpretation.   
Analysis of median values for management’s willingness to accept auditors’ control 
assessments sheds more light on the interactive effects of IAF reliance and judgment ambiguity 
on the persuasiveness of auditors’ messages.  In the more ambiguous condition, test of 
differences between Rely and Not Rely median scores provide moderately more support that 
relying on the client’s IAF influences management to be more persuaded to accept auditors’ 
control assessments than not relying on the IAF (medians = 5.00 [rely] vs. 4.00 [not rely], p = 
0.12 one-tailed; not tabled). However, in the less ambiguous condition, tests of differences 
between Rely and Not Rely median scores suggest that IAF reliance has significantly less effect 
on auditor persuasion (medians = 4.00 [rely] vs. 5.00 [not rely], p = 0.43 one-tailed; not tabled).    
The pattern of auditor persuasion observed in the Less Ambiguous condition may be due 
to a combination of the diminished effects of in-group sources on persuasion as well as 
management’s perception of the auditors.  Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) find that when the 
message is less ambiguous, the persuasion effects of in-group sources disappear.  That appears to 
be the case in this setting.  That is, when the interpretation of the control deficiency is less 
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ambiguous, auditors’ reliance on the IAF does not increase persuasion.  In fact, reliance on the 
IAF appears to have the opposite effect.  That is, management appears to penalize reliance on the 
IAF in this setting.  Interviews with accounting practitioners suggest that management may 
interpret the breakdown in controls in the less ambiguous condition to be of such an obvious 
nature that a reasonable IAF would have detected and remediated it before year-end.  In this way, 
relying on the IAF does not increase persuasion, rather it increases the salience that the IAF did 
not find and remediate this “obvious” control deficiency which has now resulted in an adverse 
ICFR opinion.  Potentially, IAF reliance in a less ambiguous control deficiency environment 
may induce management to engage in counterfactual reasoning about the existence of the control 
deficiency which may counteract the effects of in-group persuasion.  Notwithstanding this 
potential explanation, the effects of IAF reliance on management persuasion in less ambiguous 
control deficiency settings may be an area for future research.     
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 This study aims to provide evidence regarding auditor reliance on their client’s IAF as a 
persuasion tactic.  I use psychological theories related to group affiliation and persuasion to 
predict that management will have higher identification with their IAF than with auditors and be 
more persuaded to accept auditors’ control assessment when auditors rely on their IAF than 
when auditors do not.  Additionally, I predict that the effects of such persuasion will be greater 
when the underlying control deficiency assessment is more open to interpretation.  Using a 
participant group consisting of accounting professionals with experience performing internal 
controls assessments, I find evidence to some of my predictions.  Specifically, I find that 
management has higher group identification with their IAF than they do with auditors and 
perceive control testing results to be more credible when auditors rely on their IAF than when 
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auditors do not.  Further, management is more willing to accept auditor ascribed control 
deficiency assessments when auditors rely on their IAF for control testing and the judgment 
involved in evaluating the control deficiency is more conducive to varied interpretations.  
However, these persuasive effects disappear when the control assessment is less open to 
interpretation.  In fact, when the control assessment is less ambiguous, not relying on the client’s 
IAF may be a more persuasive tactic for auditors.   
 These findings also extend prior studies on auditor reliance on the client’s IAF as well as 
studies focused on auditor negotiations by providing evidence that relying on the client’s IAF 
can enhance auditors’ persuasion abilities in internal control over financial reporting audit 
contexts.  The persuasive effects of relying on the client’s IAF in settings where the control 
assessment is more ambiguous has significant implications for practice as it is likely that 
auditors’ internal control assessments will be more challenged during client negotiations when 
control deficiency issues are regarded as more open to different interpretations.  Where such 
contexts may be anticipated, auditors can increase their negotiating leverage by engaging the 
client’s IAF in audit testing.  Hence, relying on the client’s IAF for direct assistance with audit 
testing may aid auditors in having more effective discussions and negotiation exchanges with 
their client.   
 Findings from this study also suggest that auditors can increase management’s 
identification with them by relying on the client’s IAF for audit testing.  Prior studies find that 
when management identifies more with their auditor, they are more likely to engage in future 
business dealings with the auditor (Iyer et al. 1997).     
 This study provides theoretical and practical insights for academics, accounting 
regulators and practitioners.  While prior research has investigated negotiation factors such as the 
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effects of a contentious versus a collaborative negotiation approach (Honglin et al. 2011), a 
reciprocity strategy (Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007; Sanchez et al. 2007), integrative versus 
distributive strategies (Gibbins et al. 2010),  the effects of auditor concessions (Ng and Tan 
2003), this study investigates and finds evidence of the effectiveness of using the client’s IAF in 
negotiations.  This study contributes to this literature by providing evidence that relying on the 
client’s IAF can be an effective tool auditors use to persuade management.  Greater auditor 
persuasion in an internal control over financial reporting context may result in more conservative 
financial reporting, greater disclosure of material weaknesses (Lin et al. 2011), and a more 
efficient auditing process (Sanchez et al. 2007).    Further, this study provides insights to 
standard setters as they prescribe guidance for how auditors utilize the client’s IAF during the 
financial statement assurance process.  
 Future research may investigate the effects of a less ambiguous control assessment 
environment on auditors’ likelihood of persuading management.  There may be specific 
characteristics about such an environment that eliminate the in-group effect on persuasion.  
Future studies may also examine other ways in which the coordinating activities with the IAF 
may benefit the auditor-client negotiation process e.g., audit planning and risk assessment 
activities.  Future research may also investigate the effects of in-group persuasion in other 
accounting contexts where complex judgments are involved.  
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Figure 1. 
Graphical Presentation of Judgment Ambiguity Constructs in Material Weakness Control 
Deficiency (Points A and B) 
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Judgment Ambiguity Construct Definitions: 
A-  More ambiguous assessment:  
 - Marginal likelihood that misstatement is not detected or prevented (25%);  
 - High magnitude of misstatement materiality (6% of pretax income). 
B-  Less ambiguous assessment:  
 - High likelihood that misstatement is not detected or prevented (70%);  
 - Marginal magnitude of misstatement materiality (4.5% of pretax income). 
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Figure 2 
Illustration of Relative Ambiguity in Assessing “Materiality” versus “Likelihood” 
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Ambiguity in Assessing Materiality Factor of Material Weakness (MW) Control Deficiency 
(upper / lighter shaded area):  
 As the magnitude of misstatement crosses threshold from Significant to Material (right to 
left), ambiguity in assessing MW control deficiency is greater.  When magnitude of 
misstatement is highest, ambiguity in assessing MW control deficiency is lower. 
Ambiguity in Assessing Likelihood Factor of Material Weakness (MW) Control Deficiency 
(lower / darker shaded area):  
 As the likelihood of misstatement crosses threshold from Remote to Reasonably Possible 
(right to left), ambiguity in assessing MW control deficiency is greater.  When likelihood 
of misstatement is highest, ambiguity in assessing MW control deficiency is lower. 
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Figure 3 
Graphical Illustration of Theory 
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Figure 4 
Illustration of Hypothesized Effects 
Auditors’ Ability to Persuade Management (dependent variable) 
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H3 predicts an interaction between auditor reliance on the IAF and the perceived ambiguity of 
the control deficiency evaluation on management’s likelihood to be persuaded by the auditors’ 
control assessment.    
 
Variable Definitions 
- Rely on IAF – The external auditors rely on the client’s internal audit function for assistance 
with control testing. 
- Not Rely on IAF - The external auditors do not rely on the client’s internal audit function for 
assistance with control testing.  
- Less Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is less ambiguous: 
likelihood of detection is marginal and the magnitude of the misstatement is high.  
- More Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is more ambiguous: 
likelihood of detection is high and the magnitude of the misstatement is marginal. 
- Auditors’ Ability to Persuade Management – Likelihood that management will be persuaded 
to accept the auditor’s material weakness control assessment.  
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Figure 5 
Summary of Research Hypotheses, Constructs and Variables 
 
Hypothesis Independent 
Variable Construct  
Independent 
Variable Measure 
Dependent 
Variable 
Construct  
Dependent Variable 
Measure 
H1: Management 
will have higher 
group 
identification 
with the IAF than 
they will with the 
auditors. 
Internal Audit 
Function (IAF) 
 
External Auditors 
(Auditors) 
Internal Audit 
Function (IAF) 
 
External Auditors 
(Auditors) 
Management’s 
Identification 
with IAF /  
Auditors 
Agreement with 
statement using a seven 
point scale: 
 
When someone criticizes 
Tango’s internal audit 
function / external 
auditor, it feels like a 
personal insult. 
 
Tango's internal audit 
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auditor successes are my 
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When I talk about 
Tango’s internal audit 
function / external 
auditor, I usually say 
“We” rather than 
“They”. 
 
I am very interested in 
what others think about 
Tango’s internal audit 
function / external 
auditors. 
 
When someone praises 
Tango’s internal audit 
function / external 
auditors, it feels like a 
personal compliment. 
H2: Management 
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persuaded by the 
auditors’ control 
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your in-house IAF to 
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testing. 
 
Not Rely on IAF: 
Jones Auditors 
explains that they 
did not rely on your 
Auditor 
Persuasion 
Indication of willingness 
on a seven point scale: 
 
As Tango’s CFO, how 
willing are you to accept 
the external auditor’s 
control assessment of 
“material weakness?” 
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Hypothesis Independent 
Variable Construct  
Independent 
Variable Measure 
Dependent 
Variable 
Construct  
Dependent Variable 
Measure 
IAF to perform AR 
controls testing. 
H3:  When the 
assessment of the 
control deficiency 
is more open to 
interpretation 
(ambiguous), 
management will 
be more 
persuaded to 
accept the 
auditors’ control 
assessment when 
the auditors rely 
on the client’s 
IAF than when 
the auditors do 
not rely on the 
IAF. 
Auditors’ rely or not 
rely on the client’s 
IAF for control testing 
assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ambiguity in 
assessment of the 
control deficiency 
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Auditors explains 
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perform AR controls 
testing. 
 
Not Rely on IAF: 
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More Ambiguous: 
The magnitude of a 
possible 
misstatement 
resulting from this 
breakdown in 
controls is 
approximately 6% 
of income before 
taxes. 
The likelihood that 
there is a 
misstatement that is 
not prevented / 
detected, as a result 
of this internal 
control deficiency, is 
estimated at 25%.  
 
Less Ambiguous: 
The magnitude of a 
possible 
misstatement 
resulting from this 
breakdown in 
controls is 
approximately 4.5% 
of income before 
taxes. 
The likelihood that 
there is a 
misstatement that is 
Auditor 
Persuasion 
Indication of willingness 
on a seven point scale: 
 
As Tango’s CFO, how 
willing are you to accept 
the external auditor’s 
control assessment of 
“material weakness?” 
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Hypothesis Independent 
Variable Construct  
Independent 
Variable Measure 
Dependent 
Variable 
Construct  
Dependent Variable 
Measure 
not prevented / 
detected, as a result 
of this internal 
control deficiency, is 
estimated at 70%. 
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Figure 6 
Evidence from Data Collection: H2 and H3  
 
Management’s Willingness to Accept Auditors’ Control Assessment Auditors’ (dependent 
variable) 
 
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
Less Ambiguous Judgment More Ambiguous Judgment
Rely
Not Rely
 
Variable Definitions 
- Rely on IAF – The external auditors rely on the client’s internal audit function for assistance 
with AR internal control testing. 
- Not Rely on IAF - The external auditors do not rely on the client’s internal audit function for 
assistance with AR internal control testing.  
- Less Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is less ambiguous: 
likelihood of detection is high and the magnitude of the misstatement is marginal. 
- More Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is more ambiguous: 
likelihood of detection is marginal and the magnitude of the misstatement is high. 
- Management’s Willingness to Accept the Auditors’ Control Assessment (Dependent 
variable): Participants’ response to the following statement “As Tango’s CFO, how willing 
are you to accept the external auditor’s control assessment of “material weakness?”  
Participants indicate their willingness using a seven-point scale where 1 = Very Unwilling, 
4=Neither Unwilling nor Willing, and 7= Very Willing.  
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Table 1 
Participant Demographics 
 
 
Demographic All 
Participants 
Mean 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Participants in 
Data Analyses 
Mean 
(Standard 
deviation) 
t value
1
 p value
2
 
Age  (n = 115: range 21 to 72 years) 
         (n = 82: range 21 to 71 years) 
43  
(12) 
41 
(11) 
-0.93 0.35 
Gender: Male 70% 70% -0.01 0.99 
CPA designation 77% 74% -0.34 0.73 
Prior experience in public accounting 74% 71% -0.49 0.62 
For participants with prior 
public accounting experience, 
time spent in practice (years) 
9.8 
(9.6) 
8.6 
(8.2) 
-0.78 0.43 
Prior experience in internal auditing 50% 52% 0.27 0.78 
For participants with prior 
internal auditing experience, 
time spent in practice (years) 
5.0  
(3.6) 
5.1  
(3.7) 
0.11 0.91 
Internal controls experience 9.5 
(9.2) 
9.5 
(9.2) 
-0.05 0.95 
Experience discussing financial 
statement audit issues with auditors 
9.4 
(9.0) 
9.5 
(9.6) 
0.07 0.94 
n 115 82   
Notes 
1   Test of difference between means of 155 participants and 82 participants 
2   p value is two-tailed 
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Table 2 
Group Identification Scale 
Analyzed Data Sample (n=82) 
 
Identification Question
 a
  Internal 
Auditors
b
 
External 
Auditors
b
 
p-value
c
 
When someone criticizes Tango’s internal audit 
function / external auditor, it feels like a personal 
insult. 
 
4.87 
(1.57) 
[7.00] 
{1.00} 
3.17 
(1.66) 
[7.00] 
{1.00} 
<0.01 
Tango's internal audit function / external auditor 
successes are my successes. 
5.48 
(1.40) 
[7.00] 
{1.00} 
3.56 
(1.81) 
[7.00] 
{1.00} 
<0.01 
When I talk about Tango’s internal audit function / 
external auditor, I usually say “We” rather than “They”. 
4.98 
(1.65) 
[7.00] 
{1.00} 
2.72 
(1.81) 
[7.00] 
{1.00} 
<0.01 
I am very interested in what others think about Tango’s 
internal audit function / external auditors. 
5.73 
(1.04) 
[7.00] 
{3.00} 
5.33 
(1.30) 
[7.00] 
{2.00} 
<0.01 
When someone praises Tango’s internal audit function 
/ external auditors, it feels like a personal compliment. 
5.37 
(1.45) 
[7.00] 
{1.00} 
3.79 
(1.61) 
[7.00] 
{1.00} 
<0.01 
Total 5.28 
(1.12) 
[7.00] 
{2.20} 
3.71 
(1.21) 
[6.80] 
{1.80} 
<0.01 
a
 Measured on a seven-point scale with 1= “Strongly Disagree” and 7= “Strongly Agree” 
b
 Mean, (Standard Deviation), [Maximum], {Minimum} 
c
 p-values are one-tailed. 
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Table 3 
Variable Descriptive Statistics for Management’s Willingness to Accept  
the Auditors’ Control Assessment  
Auditor Reliance and Judgment Ambiguity (H2 and H3) 
Mean, [Median] and (Standard Deviation) 
 
Management’s Willingness to Accept the Auditors’ Control Assessment 1  
 Rely on IAF
2
  Not Rely on IAF
3
 Total 
Less Ambiguous Judgment
 4
 4.17 
[4.00] 
(1.83) 
n = 24 
4.85 
[5.00] 
(1.66) 
n = 20 
4.48 
[5.00] 
(1.77) 
n = 44 
More Ambiguous Judgment
5
 4.47 
[5.00] 
(1.42) 
n = 19 
3.84 
[4.00] 
(1.64) 
n = 19 
4.16 
[5.00] 
(1.55) 
n = 38 
Total 4.30 
[5.00] 
(1.65) 
n = 43 
4.36 
[5.00] 
(1.70) 
n = 39 
 
1
  Management’s Willingness to Accept the Auditors’ Control Assessment (Dependent 
variable): Participants’ response to the following statement “As Tango’s CFO, how willing 
are you to accept the external auditor’s control assessment of “material weakness?”  
Participants indicate their willingness using a seven-point scale where 1 = Very Unwilling, 
4=Neither Unwilling nor Willing, and 7= Very Willing. 
2
  Rely on IAF – The external auditors rely on the client’s internal audit function for assistance 
with AR internal control testing. 
3
  Not Rely on IAF - The external auditors do not rely on the client’s internal audit function for 
assistance with AR internal control testing.  
4
  Less Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is less ambiguous: 
likelihood of detection is high and the magnitude of the misstatement is marginal. 
5
  More Ambiguous Judgment – The evaluation of the control deficiency is more ambiguous: 
likelihood of detection is marginal and the magnitude of the misstatement is high.  
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 Table 4 
Test of Hypothesis H2 and H3 
ANOVA of Management’s Willingness to Accept the Auditors’ Control Assessment  
Factor Df Sum of 
Squares 
F p-value
a
 
Prior Public Accounting Experience 1 7.162 2.65 .05 
Reliance on IAF 1 0.32 0.12 .36 
Judgment Ambiguity 1 1.11 0.41 .26 
Reliance on IAF*Judgment Ambiguity 1 8.42 3.11 .04 
Error 77 207.98   
Notes 
a
 p-value is one-tailed 
Variable definitions: 
As defined in Table 3 
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Appendix  
Experimental Instrument (Qualtrics online screen shots) 
 
All participants see the Informed Consent screens below. 
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Participants who select the option to exit the study are directed to the screen below. 
 
 
Participants who indicate they would like to continue to the study are directed to the screen 
below. 
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Participants who are randomly assigned to the Rely / More Ambiguous condition see the 
following screens: 
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Participants who are randomly assigned to the Rely / Less Ambiguous condition see the 
following screens: 
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Participants who are randomly assigned to the Not Rely / More Ambiguous condition see the 
following screens: 
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Participants who are randomly assigned to the Not Rely / Less Ambiguous condition see the 
following screens: 
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All participants see the following screens: 
Experimental Questions 
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End of the study. 
 
 
 
